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The previous campaign of 2010 produced electoral firsts in media terms (the 
televised leaders’ debates), drama and unpredictability (‘Cleggmania’), and 
memorable moments (Gordon Brown’s ‘bigoted woman’ comments) all of which 
disrupted the parties’ planned scripts. Arguably, the 2015 election seems to have been 
its very antithesis. The plodding six week campaign has been widely been portrayed 
as dull, stage-managed, narrowly focused and lacking in surprise moments, but with a 
dramatic ending on election night, as the broadcasters announced the shock exit poll.  
The disbelieving former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown declared ‘he would 
eat his hat’ if his party suffered the losses predicted by the forecast; in fact the result 
was even worse.  Ashdown like so many of his fellow commentators, whether of the 
traditional offline or online media varieties, was stunned by the apparent failure of the 
opinion polls to foresee the Conservative victory.  What followed was the political 
equivalent of ‘exit velocity’ in the aftermath of a plodding election, with frenetic, 
intensive debate over the future of the UK sparking the kind of passion lacking in the 
preceding campaign. 
 The 2015 campaign as reported in the media was predicated on the assumption 
that the outcome would be another hung parliament and, possibly, coalition 
government. This was constantly reinforced by a stream of experts and opinion-
formers fixated on what might happen after the election rather what had just happened 
in the previous parliament. This augmented the potential power broking role of 
emerging ‘challengers’ such as UKIP, the SNP and Greens at the marked expense of 
the Liberal Democrats, clear beneficiaries of the added exposure they had received in 
2010.  Yet if the campaign differed in terms of its focus on these growing political 
parties it was also reminiscent of the previous one with its similar emphasis on polls 
and other aspects of the ‘horse race’.  This will be explored in more detail together 
with an evaluation of the role played by broadcasting, particularly the leader debates, 
as well as the partisan press.  Consideration will also be given to the influence of 
social media platforms during the campaign and their place as both a source of 
additional election news and commentary as well as communication for parties keen 
to exploit their strategic potential. 
 
The Traditional Media Campaign:  Issues and Personalities 
The Conservatives’ successful campaign was directed by Lynton Crosby, the 
strategist who helped guide John Howard to power in their native Australia.  Crosby 
subsequently worked for the Tories in the 2005 General Election before overseeing 
Boris Johnson’s successful campaigns to be Mayor of London in 2008 and 2012.  The 
earlier Johnson triumph was set against the backdrop of a rapidly worsening financial 
crisis that would undermine the then incumbent Labour government.  During the 2015 
General Election Crosby aimed to exploit continuing voter anxieties about this 
economic trauma.   
The Conservatives ran a focused campaign that remorselessly promoted the 
substantive issues that would come to dominate the news agenda:  the economy, tax 
and constitutional matters (see Table 14.1). 
 
 
 
Table 14.1 here 
   By contrast policy areas that might have been more problematic for the 
Conservatives, such as Labour’s favoured theme of the NHS and UKIP’s equivalent 
issue, immigration, received less journalistic attention.  Furthermore there was the 
now established media fixation with electoral process, particularly the apparent 
closeness of the two major parties in the opinion polls.  Crosby was himself scathing 
about the proliferation of commentators who viewed the election as ‘entertainment’.1  
Yet their speculation helped reinforce a key Tory claim that dominated the narrative 
especially in the closing stages of the election:  the fear of Labour taking office with 
SNP support. 2   This was supported by an advertising campaign that depicted a 
diminutive Ed Miliband as being either in the pocket of or having his strings pulled by 
the SNP leader.3  By contrast there was relatively little media commentary on the 
possibility or consequences of a majority Conservative government beyond the 
Labour supporting Daily Mirror.  
Media speculation as to the likely nature of a minority or coalition led 
government reinforced the already considerable news interest ‘minor’ parties whose 
leaders received unprecedented levels of publicity with Nicola Sturgeon and Nigel 
Farage among the top five most high profile politicians during the campaign (see 
Table 14.2).  If the attention devoted to Sturgeon underlined the electoral significance 
of the constitutional issue, the presence of George Osborne and Ed Balls in the top ten 
reflected the importance of the economic debate.  Tony Blair even made a significant 
re-appearance warning against the threat of the UK leaving Europe and helping 
ensure this debate was not dominated by UKIP. 
 
Table 14.2 here 
  
 
The election campaign itself was a series of largely anodyne, staged for 
camera events usually featuring the party leader that were managed by spin-doctors 
keen to exert control over the news agenda.  Sympathetic audiences of supporters 
assembled for visiting politicians’ speeches, press conferences and photo-
opportunities in marginal seats.  Popular locations for these events included the kinds 
of factories and schools populated by members of the ‘hard working families’ that had 
become such a clichéd part of the political narrative.  Chancellor George Osborne 
made frequent appearances of this kind kitted out in the requisite high visibility jacket 
and safety hat in his attempts to identify with what he termed the ‘strivers’ over the 
‘skivers’.   
There was a dearth of the type of unexpected encounter that so spectacularly 
derailed Gordon Brown’s campaign in 2010 following his meeting with Gillian 
Duffy.  There were however a few newsworthy gaffes.  In one speech David Cameron 
expressed support for West Ham and later apologized to his fellow Aston Villa fans, 
but this was not a career defining moment for a Prime Minister who had already 
established his leadership credentials. In contrast, Ed Miliband appeared less self-
assured, notably when he partially stumbled whilst leaving the stage of the final live 
broadcast debate of the campaign.  His subsequent unveiling of a huge tablet of stone 
with six campaign pledges on it, the so-called ‘EdStone’, provoked considerable 
mockery compounded when the Vice Chair of Labour’s campaign, Lucy Powell, 
appeared to suggest to BBC Five Live’s Peter Allen that the promises could be 
broken.  
 The Televised Debates 
In contrast with 2010, negotiations over the format of the leader debates were 
protracted and nearly ended in failure.  This was mainly because David Cameron 
wanted to avoid participating in the kind of events he claimed had ‘sucked the life 
out’ of the previous campaign. The Prime Minister did ultimately participate, but on 
his own terms with six other party leaders involved.  UKIP’s case to be included in 
the leader debates for the first time had been substantially enhanced when broadcast 
regulator Ofcom afforded them ‘major party’ status in the aftermath of their 2014 
European election triumph and support in the opinion polls.4 Cameron and his media 
adviser, Craig Oliver, subsequently tried to minimize rather than challenge Farage’s 
right to participate in the debates through insisting the Greens must also be present on 
the platform.  This forced the broadcasters’ to abandon their original joint proposal 
for three encounters in which Farage would appear once, Clegg twice and Cameron 
and Miliband throughout.  What ultimately emerged was a substantially different 
series of programmes.   
The most watched broadcast debate was the ITV programme on 2nd April, 
seen by 5.88 million viewers, the seventh most popular item on the channel that 
week.5   Seven party leaders featured, including Cameron in his only face-to-face 
appearance alongside his rivals (Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, UKIP, 
SNP and Plaid Cymru).  The SNP had threatened legal action after being excluded 
from the 2010 debates but entered the 2015 negotiations in a stronger position 
following the previous year’s Independence Referendum.  The SNP’s inclusion 
strengthened the ultimately successful claims of Plaid Cymru leader, Leanne Wood, 
for involvement.  The broadcasters did however refuse the Northern Irish parties’ 
attempts to participate.    
 Leanne Wood was prominent in one of the more newsworthy exchanges of the 
ITV debate.  Wood reprimanded Nigel Farage for his criticisms of ‘health tourism’ 
involving migrants with HIV coming to the UK for treatment.  But it was Nicola 
Sturgeon who appeared to gain most momentum when she was judged to have 
performed well and even ‘won’, albeit by a small margin, in one of the post-debate 
polls. Sturgeon appeared in the other face-to-face encounter on 16th April between the 
opposition ‘challenger’ parties that attracted 4.35 million viewers.6  Controversially 
the Conservatives’ refusal to have the Prime Minister participate in another such 
encounter also led to their negotiators’ insistence that the Liberal Democrats should 
not be allowed a platform that should be the preserve of opposition politicians.7  In 
Cameron’s and Clegg’s absence, the key exchange occurred when Miliband 
categorically refused to entertain Sturgeon’s proposition that they could lock the 
Tories out of power. Farage courted more controversy when he criticized the BBC 
over what he alleged was its selection of a disproportionately ‘left-wing’ audience.  
The debate concluded with the three female ‘progressive alliance’ leaders (Sturgeon, 
Wood and the Greens’ Natalie Bennett) collectively embracing in what proved to be 
one of the most memorable images of the campaign.   
 The two leaders’ debates were sandwiched between a pair of live programmes 
that featured leaders making separate appearances.  The first of these was a joint 
venture on 26 March, Cameron and Miliband Live: the Battle for Number Ten, 
involving Sky and Channel 4 that effectively started the election campaign and 
attracted 2.60 million viewers. 8  This hybrid format had former BBC Newsnight 
presenter Jeremy Paxman and audience members interrogating the two main party 
leaders in separate sections of the same broadcast.  Paxman appeared to unsettle 
Cameron with questioning about food banks and zero hours contracts.  In contrast Ed 
Miliband was judged to have performed well, albeit starting with low expectations 
borne out of poor poll ratings.  Miliband memorably responded ‘hell yes’ when asked 
if he was tough enough to be Prime Minister. 
 The final live leaders’ event was a BBC Question Time Special on 30 April 
involving the Coalition and Labour parties seen by 3.77 million.9  David Cameron 
opened the proceedings and came through relatively unscathed whereas Miliband’s 
subsequent denial that the previous Labour government had spent too much money in 
office provoked an audible groan from the audience.  The incident highlighted the 
extent to which the Conservatives’ had successively established their view as the 
dominant economic narrative.   
 The understandable media focus on TV programmes featuring the leaders 
overshadowed the range of broadcasts involving other party spokespeople.  The 
BBC’s Daily Politics hosted a series of debates with five of the relevant portfolio 
holders discussing key policy areas such as the economy, education and welfare.  The 
latter programme featured particularly animated exchanges between Iain Duncan 
Smith and his Green opponent.  The involvement of this and the other challenger 
parties helped guarantee they were represented in an election campaign to an 
unprecedented degree. 
 
Broadcasting 
Throughout the campaign politicians made concerted efforts to try to connect 
with specific groups of potential voters.  While the recent proliferation of niche 
channels and the fragmentation of audiences may have exacerbated this tendency the 
trend stretches back further.  Party strategists have long prioritized less formal 
discussion based formats as a means of engaging viewers believed to be less 
interested in politics but nonetheless likely to vote.  Examples of this in the lead-up to 
and during the 2015 were appearances by the main leaders on ITV’s This Morning 
and by party representatives on the same network’s daytime talk show Loose Women. 
 Broadcasters devoted significant airtime to audience-led discussion based 
election programming.10  Most obviously this included familiar strands such as such 
as BBC Question Time and Radio 4’s Any Questions.  There were also several newer 
innovations.  BBC2 and ITV1 used the campaign to launch two new shows hosted by 
Victoria Derbyshire and James O’Brien respectively.  More niche outlets provided 
features tailored to their specific audiences.  BBC Three TV and Radio 1 Newsbeat, 
for instance, aired question and answer sessions for young people that were more 
interactive and often livelier, unpredictable affairs than the more staid and formal 
debates between the party leaders.    
 The leaders continued to participate in familiar broadcast rituals such as the 
BBC series of interrogations by Evan Davis, but other less formal interviews appeared 
to garner more newsworthy material.  A news feature by BBC journalist James 
Lansdale on David Cameron aired just before the formal campaign elicited the 
admission that, in the event of a Conservative victory, his next term in office would 
also be his final one.  The BBC ran a corresponding profile of Ed Miliband who could 
not have predicted the ensuing controversy provoked by the number of kitchens in his 
house.  
 Daily Mail columnist Sarah Vine, wife of Chief Whip Michael Gove, 
described the Labour leader’s kitchen as ‘bland, functional, humourless, cold’ and the 
Milibands as ‘alien’.11  Vine struggled to defend her insults on BBC’s This Week, 
particularly when it transpired - as she herself had speculated in her article - that the 
space was in fact a utility room.  Ed Miliband’s ‘real’ kitchen and him cooking in it 
featured prominently in another informal profile for ITV’s Tonight by political editor 
Tom Bradby.  Bradby’s was part of a series that gave particular prominence to the 
leaders’ spouses, reinforcing a trend established in the 2010 campaign.   
 The leaders of the SNP, Plaid and the Greens were profiled by ITV’s Julie 
Etchingham to provide further insights into the personalities of these prominent 
women including a relaxed Nicola Sturgeon who was shown at home talking about 
herself and her background.  The Green leader Natalie Bennett also fared much better 
in her appearance in stark contrast to an awkward pre-campaign interview with LBC 
radio after which she admitted to having felt ‘devastated’ after failing to explain her 
party’s housing policy. 
 
The Press 
The campaign experienced the kind of hostile print media coverage of Labour 
not seen since the 1992 General Election.  By 2010, The Sun had returned to the 
Conservative fold with a positive front-page endorsement of Cameron.  Ed Miliband’s 
highly publicized criticisms of Sun owner Rupert Murdoch during the hacking scandal 
of 2011 further soured the already poor relations between the party and the newspaper 
culminating in the still best-selling paper devoting the front page of its 2015 polling 
day issue to ridiculing Miliband based on an infamous 2014 photograph of the Labour 
leader struggling to eat a bacon sandwich.  Accompanied by the slogan ‘Save Our 
Bacon’, the Sun strongly urged readers to endorse the Conservatives as the way to 
avoid disaster.  Table 14.3 provides a guide to which parties were supported by which 
newspapers 
  
Table 14.3 here 
 
 
Although newspapers have seen a decline in their paper sales they still appear 
confident in their own ability to shape the wider news agenda.  Roy Greenslade 
believed this was a decisive factor on polling day: 
‘I am sure that the relentless ridicule over the six-week campaign may have 
played some part in the voting decisions of the floating voters who buy the 
Sun and the Mail (and yes, there are plenty of them).’12 
 
The Sun and other members of a ‘Tory press’ that dominates the national newspaper 
industry (see Table 14.3) published numerous anti-Labour stories during the 
campaign.  Attacks on Miliband were frequent and his adviser David Axelrod, former 
strategist for Barack Obama, called the British print media more partisan than even 
his native US television networks.13  The Daily Mail tried to insinuate that a leader it 
routinely called ‘Red Ed’ had enjoyed a complex love life when, on its own evidence, 
this was far from the case.14  The Sun also questioned Miliband’s character when he 
agreed to a high profile meeting with Russell Brand, who had previously used his 
huge social media presence – including around 10 million Twitter followers - to 
strongly criticize the newspaper and its veteran proprietor Rupert Murdoch.   
The centre-right ‘quality’ newspapers took a more cerebral approach in their 
reporting of the campaign.  But they nonetheless appeared keen to help Cameron.  A 
letter from 103 business people supporting the current government’s economic 
policies was originally printed on the front page in the Daily Telegraph before being 
recycled by the major broadcast news outlets.  Furthermore The Times and even the 
normally anti-Conservative Independent endorsed the continuation of the Coalition as 
the best electoral outcome.  The possibility of a minority Labour government being 
‘propped up’ by the SNP led the Daily Mail to use its front-page to suggest Nicola 
Sturgeon was the ‘Most Dangerous Women in Britain’.  Intriguingly while the 
London version of the Sun took a similar line to the Mail regarding Sturgeon and her 
party, the Scottish edition enthusiastically endorsed the Nationalists and campaigned 
for their victory north of the border.  UKIP also secured a notable first with formal 
endorsement of the party by the Daily Express, a longstanding opponent of the 
European Union. 
 
The Internet and Social Media Campaign 
If the broadcast and newsprint media campaign followed traditional patterns 
then the internet and social media was expected, in some quarters, to produce 
something different. Yet reporting about internet campaigning superficially also 
followed a familiar pattern. The news media once again posed a straw man question 
of whether this would be an internet or social media election even though there was 
little sense of what a social media election might mean.15 As with the 2010 campaign, 
‘the internet election narrative’ enabled the news media to hype up the potential of 
social media often then to dismiss its importance and usefulness as the campaign 
progressed16. However, it was not simply a case of history repeating itself. There was 
clear evidence this time of considerable activity around popular Twitter and Facebook 
platforms such as #GE2015.  Aside from the nebulous question of whether it was a 
social media election, broadly three areas of interest emerged around the 2015 
campaign and internet technologies: First, was the internet/social media challenging 
traditional campaign styles and becoming a crucial tool for parties? Second, which 
parties were most active in using internet tools and where? Third, did internet activity 
and competition have much impact in terms of mobilising support or influencing the 
behaviour of electors and could social media data be used to predict electoral 
outcomes? 
 
Internet Campaign Style 
As early as the 2001 General Election, pundits and politicians such as 
Labour’s campaign strategist Douglas Alexander were predicting the end of the so-
called command and control election campaign.17 Technology it was suggested would 
open up more interactive and conversational elections where voters would no longer 
be passive spectators but could challenge and take a more active role in campaign.18 
One other less highlighted aspect of Internet era campaigns was the continued growth 
of data gathering exercises to identify and target key voters with more individualised 
messages (narrowcasting). Yet, despite these possibilities, the growth of the social 
media audience and a tidal wave of noise online, the standard response to the 2015 
campaign was that it was another dull, stage-managed, risk adverse election both on 
and offline.19 Criticism of party online campaigns followed a familiar pattern: that 
they had failed to exploit the channels available and, even when they did so, they 
(re)produced unimaginative content. For example, most parties restricted themselves 
to a narrow range of social media channels. Only Labour had an Instagram account 
(to limited effect) whilst the Greens were the only party to use Reddit. Although the 
Conservatives dabbled with Buzzfeed it was hardly ground-breaking content. The 
result was a standard media style interview with David Cameron that generated 
minimal excitement. Indeed, commentators pointed out that much social media 
content simply documented campaign events, re-stated basic pledges or attacked 
opponents rather than necessarily producing anything fresh.20  There were little or no 
attempts from leading politicians to interact in online dialogue with voters. In short, 
social media was deployed as just another broadcast tool with little focus on the 
social. The idea that the parties did not get it was also underpinned by lack of focus 
on digital issues in the campaign.21   
 Disappointment with the parties’ internet campaigns has become a recurring 
theme since 1997. It has some validity but arguably provides an oversimplified 
portrayal of online electioneering. First, criticism tends to be technology-driven based 
on what technology can do rather than how it is shaped by the electoral and political 
environment. Second, it tends to be focused on concerns about stimulating wider 
democratic conversation and participation, (although laudable aims), sometimes 
ignore the harsh reality of campaigning from a party perspective. Third, critiques are 
concentrated mainly on the most public aspects of the online campaign at the expense 
of the private, data-crunching, drier aspects of modern campaigns.  
 Whilst the output of the campaign might not have matched idealistic 
democratic notions of a ‘conversational democracy’, it is clear that parties were 
deploying technologies to greater extent than previously and in some cases with much 
greater level of internal scrutiny. Party campaign officials have subsequently claimed 
that their parties pursued digital strategies much more seriously than in 2010. In an 
interview with Channel 4 News, the Conservatives Creative Director noted the change 
from the last election campaign: 
[In 2010] We didn't actually stop, we didn't really measure the stats we 
just did things that we thought would be interesting and exciting at the 
time… Now there's a completely analytical approach to it.22  
 
Overall, no single Internet campaigning style emerged amongst the parties 
despite the two main parties both hiring heavyweight specialists from the Obama 
campaign team, (Jim Messina for the Conservatives and David Axelrod for Labour). 
The Conservatives’ campaign could be characterised as a more top-down, data-
driven, targeted marketing approach – spending significant sums of money on 
Facebook advertising and data mining.23 Leaked documents to the BBC suggested the 
Conservatives were spending over £100,000 per month on Facebook and up to £3,000 
per month in key constituencies in the run up to the campaign. This contrasted with a 
reported figure of less than £10,000 per month by Labour.24 Social media videos and 
posters were then used to drive home Conservative Party messages particularly about 
the threat of the SNP. Some critics likened these to negative US style attack ads not 
allowed on UK broadcast media. Perhaps more crucially, the advertising was also 
combined with a strategy of micro-targeting notably in key marginal seats in South-
West England held by the Liberal Democrats. Online data, particularly from 
Facebook was mined and combined with private polling and focus groups to identify 
the concerns of undecided voters and target them with personalised communication 
through a range of methods (phone, email, letter, in person).25   
 Labour strategy by contrast tended towards a more grassroots, core audience 
approach seemingly investing much effort in gaining traction through Twitter 
conversations and mobilising supporters on the ground. Similarly, with regard to 
Facebook, one party insider was quoted as suggesting that ‘we’re targeting people we 
know are Labour supporters… to get them to donate and volunteer’. 26  In part, 
therefore, the differences in approach reflect the state of both the party campaign 
resources but also their overall campaign strategies. Matthew McGregor one of 
Labour’s key digital advisors commented on the parties’ internet campaigns:  
The fact they [the Conservatives] are outspending the Labour Party many, 
many times over because of the support from millionaire donors is going 
to have an impact… [but] That's something the Labour Party can respond 
to by out-organising the Conservatives.27 
 
That parties adopted different approaches to technology and social media underlines 
the point that party context is at least as significant as the technology itself in shaping 
their campaigns. 
 Whilst much of public content on social media was undoubtedly safe, 
occasionally parties did try something different although it is not clear that it had 
much impact or was conducted with much confidence. The Greens’ YouTube election 
broadcast ‘Change the Tune’ did gain some coverage with over 886,000 views, more 
than all the mainstream party broadcasts. The most high profile social media event of 
the campaign was Ed Miliband’s meeting with comedian Russell Brand streamed 
through Brand’s Trews YouTube channel. Given Brand’s potential audience (around 
one million) this might been seen as useful means of reaching out to people beyond 
mainstream politics, although Brand’s subsequent endorsement of Labour came at 
such a late stage in the campaign, (the week before polling) that it negated much of its 
potential impact. Brand’s intervention also allowed Conservative newspapers and 
opponents to accuse Miliband of trivialising the campaign, being obsessed with 
celebrity and underlining his lack of Prime Ministerial gravitas. 
 Despite, and perhaps in response to, the supposed dullness of the official 
election an alternative online campaign sphere of memes, viral videos, photo shopped 
posters and satirical hashtags again emerged. Some of these were non-partisan and 
had minimal political intent. For example, the #dogsatpollingstations, where people 
took photos of their dog at polling booths, proved to be one of the more popular 
hashtags on election-day. However, many do have more serious intent and are 
directed at the stage-managed nature of modern campaigns, by targeting and 
attempting to subvert and ridicule the campaign messages and images of parties. One 
of the most popular was the Twitter response to Ed Miliband’s pledge stone. 
#EdStone led to a rash of photo shopped images of Miliband with an array of 
parodied pledges. Whilst the growth of this type of social media content can be seen 
as a reflection of voter discontent and cynicism with politics, it also targets the way 
politics is portrayed through the news media. This was first noted in 2010, with the 
#NickCleggtoblame hashtag responding to Conservative newspaper attacks on Nick 
Clegg. In 2015, similar hashtags emerged, notably the rather unlikely #Milifandom 
where the audience expressed their support (even love) for Ed. Behind the celebrity 
fan tone was a serious message about countering and ridiculing the negative 
newspaper attacks on Ed Miliband. As one of creators of #Milifandom argued: ‘[it] is 
not a joke. It’s young people angry at the distorted presentation of Ed, trying to 
correct that + make themselves heard.’ Similarly, #Dollgate was partially used as a 
response to the Sun’s strident attack on Nicola Sturgeon. 
 Whilst technology might have enabled some voters to move beyond passive 
spectating, as yet there often appears minimal connection between the official 
campaign and the lively alternative, satirical campaign sphere. Parties find it difficult 
to involve themselves with these trends with good reason – as formal rather staid 
organisations it is difficult for the major parties to capitalise on the informal and 
satirical without both appearing to lack authenticity and also opening themselves up 
to further attacks from news media about credibility, therefore distracting from 
serious messages of their campaign.  
 
Competition and Impact Online 
A persistent election sub-theme was attempts to declare a winner of the social 
media battle and try to translate social media activity into electoral outcomes. This 
raises the question of whether the Internet enables smaller or outsider parties to 
become more competitive. Further interest was generated by the idea that younger 
voters, who are traditionally the least likely to vote, could be reached more effectively 
via social than by traditional media. In the run up to the 2015 campaign, a MORI poll 
suggested that up to a third of younger voters had claimed that social media would 
influence their voting behaviour.  
 Looking for winners and losers online, however, proved somewhat confusing, 
as nearly all the main players in the election were at some point declared to have won 
something. Labour was repeatedly said to have had the dominant presence on 
Twitter28 whilst the SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon was declared to have been the most talked 
about leader on that medium. UKIP and the Conservatives were said to have led the 
way on Facebook with 15.6 and 12.2 million interactions respectively (compendium 
measure of likes, postings, shares and comments) compared to 9.7 million for Labour. 
It was also suggested at various points that UKIP and Nigel Farage achieved high 
prominence online particularly through the high volume of Google searches. 29 
Perhaps the only relative media consensus was a suggested under performance of the 
Liberal Democrats across the board. This is a significant reversal of traditional 
patterns of online campaigning where the Liberal Democrats have often been seen as 
punching above their weight. 
 More elaborate analysis from the 2015 campaign does suggest that social 
media allow certain smaller parties a greater competitive presence. Analysis of 
Twitter data suggests that the SNP outperformed the rest not simply because they had 
all their candidates using Twitter but that their reach was significantly expanded by 
the fact that there tweets were mentioned many more times. For example, 100 tweets 
from SNP candidates generated 10 times more mentions than the same number from 
the Liberal Democrats. 30 Smaller parties (particularly the Greens and UKIP) also 
performed well in terms of sharing and likes of online campaign posters leading 
Campbell and Lee to argue that ‘while still not a level playing field to some degree 
some of the minor parties are outperforming he major parties on social media’.31  
 Following the election, Nigel Farage has claimed that social media was 
responsible for expanding the party’s appeal, enabling it to reach new audiences and 
changing the party image from one of retired colonels to a younger more female 
demographic. He stated: 
What is really clear is that the pickup in vote has been due to our success 
on social media and it's now under 30s that are beginning to vote for UKIP 
in significant numbers.32  
Whilst some of this might be hyperbole, UKIP undoubtedly improved its online 
position from 2010, where it tended to lag in terms of social media presence. 
Similarly, the SNP has also claimed it reached new audiences in rural Scotland and 
projected itself beyond Scotland’s borders through partly through their well-
established online presence.  
 Nevertheless, although the online world allows some minor players greater 
presence exposure and potential competitiveness, it is not a straightforward level 
playing field. Those minor parties able to compete and benefit were often amplified 
by their appearance in televised leadership debates and mainstream media coverage. 
Moreover, in the case of SNP, it is hardly a minor party in the Scottish context and 
capitalised on their mobilisation success in the independence referendum eight 
months earlier. This underscores two potentially key elements in the use of Internet 
campaign tools. Firstly, the importance of building longer term relationships online in 
a variety of contexts, (not just social media but email also), rather than merely trying 
to stimulate last minute mobilisation during short election campaigns. Secondly, the 
separation of Internet from other media formats is increasingly an artificial divide. 
Online media, broadcast and newsprint campaigns are increasingly intertwined and 
interdependent.33  
 The eventual Conservative triumph led to suggestions that social media 
activity and social media metrics were as inaccurate as the opinion polls in terms of 
predicting outcome or mobilising voters. For instance, one high profile project 
combining Twitter and survey data (which had previously correctly predicted the 
outcome of Greek elections) mirrored almost exactly the inaccurate predictions of 
most opinion polls. Moreover, as noted above, Twitter, in particular, exaggerated 
Labour’s levels of support and mobilisation. Indeed, post-election day, Twitter 
seemed awash with left of centre voters expressing their shock and outrage at the 
result.  
‘Echo chambers’, ‘amplification effects’ and the potential polarisation of 
media audiences were themes that received increased attention straight after the 
election. One intriguing analysis of Twitter during the campaign argued that relatively 
small numbers of partisan voices from the so-called ‘political twitterati’ (journalists 
and party campaigners) can dominate and amplify certain arguments and sentiment. 
During the televised leaders debates a relative handful of Labour and SNP Twitter 
accounts, in particular, were successful apparently dominating response providing a 
potentially misleading picture of strength of voter sentiment when magnified by 
newspapers uncritical response to social media data.34 
 Disappointment that social media did not provide clear cut answers to 
questions of mobilisation or support is perhaps not surprising given the relatively 
dubious or superficial way that much social media data was reported. The simple use 
of metrics such as likes or re-tweets is a crude and possibly misleading measure of 
performance. For example, whilst the number of Google searches might provide a 
basic indication of levels of interest, a look at the content of the searches makes it 
difficult to understand the significance of numbers. For instance, a snapshot (on 21 
April) of the most popular Google search questions about party leaders seemed to 
indicate that the British public has an obsession with height and age of its party 
leaders, along with wanting know who their spouses were. Google data also indicated 
that over the campaign whilst Cameron was the most searched for politician, the most 
frequently asked questions about him were whether he was rich, married, dead, left-
handed or, indeed, a Labour politician.35  
 If use of raw numbers is problematic, further concerns surround those 
producing such data. Social media analytic companies with products or services to 
sell are unlikely to take a sober assessment of social media performance.36 None of 
this means that social media analytics in general is worthless but a more considered 
analysis of the wealth of data generated in the campaign is required. This is likely to 
take considerably longer but could generate potentially more interesting findings than 
trying to answer questions about who won or was it a social media election. Wider 
consensus is needed both on techniques and how to interpret data. Similarly, such 
analyses will need to be married to more traditional survey data questions about the 
role and impact of the social media. 
 
Conclusion 
After the 2010 televised leaders’ debates, electoral campaigning in the UK 
was supposed to have undergone a seismic shift. Yet in some respects 2015 took us 
back in time. The televised debates, whilst still major campaign events, did not 
dominate as they had at the previous campaign. Whilst they were key features of the 
early part of the campaign and brought the novelty of multi party campaigning into 
focus, their impact declined as campaign dragged on. Indeed, the supposedly 
moribund newsprint media, have latterly been seen as playing an important role in 
agenda setting and magnifying the ‘horse race’ aspect of the election.  Cumulatively, 
and driven by a surfeit of polling data, they helped forge a consensus that this was an 
election race too close to call with one quality newspaper editorial even declaring, 
without any hint of doubt, that:  ‘A hung parliament is certain this week’.37  This 
widely held assumption was shared by online as well as broadcast commentators who 
were in fact the same opinion-formers whatever the media platform.  These were also 
the pundits who David Cameron’s strategist Lynton Crosby dismissed for having 
treated the campaign as more of an entertainment than critical news story.  
Publication of the exit poll on election night was a sobering moment, not least 
because the surprise confirmation of a Conservative lead had echoes of the not too 
distant 1992 campaign denouement. 
Lynton Crosby and his Conservative colleagues were focused in their 
campaigning and exploited the supposed threat of a possible Labour-SNP coalition 
government to raise serious questions of Ed Miliband and his party’s economic 
record.  These themes found a ready echo in the once again decidedly ‘Tory press’ so 
that Miliband’s more distant rather than Cameron’s recent record in government  
appeared to dominate media coverage, particularly in the closing stages of the 
campaign.  This reinforced the Conservatives’ internet campaigning which though 
supposed to disrupt the style of modern electioneering by fostering new participatory 
activism was arguably most successfully used by the party for a professionalized, top 
down marketing approach. This strategy rehearsed their twin campaign themes of 
economic competency and fear of Scottish nationalism.  The latter of course was 
recognition of a new trend where the 2015 election did differ from previous ones, 
specifically in the increased media exposure for some of the minor parties.  Whilst 
traditional media is still skewed towards the main parties and their leaders, some 
minor parties do now appear to have got their foot in the door. This is even more the 
case in the social media world, which whilst not a level playing field, offers a more 
accurate reflection of the multi party nature of British politics.  
 
  
 Table 14.1:  Top Ten Campaign Issues, by percentage of television and radio 
coverage (30 March - 7 May)38 
TV      % Rank Press      % 
Election process 45.9 1 Election process 44.5 
Economy 8.1 2 Economy 10.5 
Constitutional 6.2 3 Taxation 6.5 
Taxation 5.4 4 Standards 3.8 
Employment 4.4 5 Constitutional 3.7 
Immigration/Race 3.7 6 NHS 3.7 
NHS 3.5 7 Immigration/Race 3.5 
Business 3 8 Europe 3.4 
Social Security 2.4 9 Employment 2.9 
Europe  2.4 10 Business 2.6 
 
  
Table 14.2:  Top Ten personalities by media (TV and press) appearance39  
(30 March-7 May) 
 Rank Name % Party 
1 David Cameron 15.0 Cons 
2 Ed Miliband 14.7 Labour 
3 Nick Clegg 6.5 Lib Dem 
4 Nicola Sturgeon 5.7 SNP 
5 Nigel Farage 5.5 UKIP 
6 George Osborne 3.8 Cons 
7 Ed Balls 2.5 Labour 
8 Boris Johnson 1.7 Cons 
9= Jim Murphy  0.9 Labour 
9= Tony Blair 0.9 Labour 
Note: % = number of individual against all individual appearances 
 
 
  
 Table 14.3 National daily newspaper declarations and their readerships 
Title Party Unique 
browsers 
Circulation 
Guardian Labour 7.2 0.18 
Times Conservative/Lib Dem 
Coalition 
Paywall 0.39 
Telegraph Conservative 4.00 0.49 
Financial Times Conservative/Lib Dem 
Coalition 
Paywall 0.21 
Independent Conservative/Lib Dem 
Coalition 
2.33 0.06 
Mail Conservative 13.64 1.63 
Express UKIP 0.78 0.44 
The Sun Conservative Paywall 1.86 
Mirror Labour 3.74  0.88 
Star None 0.51 0.42 
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation 
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